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I.
A song, a poem of itself-the word itself a dirge,
Amid the wilds, the rocks, the storm and wintry night,
To me such misty, strange tableaux the syllables calling up ....
-Walt Whitman, Yonnondio
As part of the "sacred text," the land-like sacred texts in other tradi-
tions-is not primarily a book of answers, "but rather a principal sym-
bol of, perhaps the principal symbol of, and thus a central occasion of
recalling and heeding, the fundamental aspirations of the tradition."1
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1. Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay, 34 S.D.L. REV. 246, 269
(1989) (quoting M. PERRY, MORALrrY, PoLrrics & LAW 137 (1988)). Although Pommersheim's
article deals specifically with the Lakota, a Great Plains Tribe, his insight extends to other indige-
nous peoples, including the Mashpee Tribe of Cape Cod, Massachusetts, whose 1976 land claim
action is the focus of this essay. Given the length of time the Mashpee have had to deal with assimi-
lation pressures from the outside, non-Indian community, perhaps the insight is actually more ap-
propriate to the eastern Tribes than to those of the American west.
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When Walt Whitman wrote his poem Yonnondio2 for the collection
Leaves of Grass, he added the following parenthetical explanation under
the title: "The sense of the word is lament for the aborigines. It is an
Iroquois term; and has been used for a personal name."' 3 In fact, Yon-
nondio also is the title of a long narrative poem by William H.C. Hosmer
published in 1844 with the subtitle Warriors of the Genesee: A Tale of the
Seventeenth Century.4 That poem, Hosmer wrote, is a description of
"the memorable attempt of the Marquis de Nonville, under pretext of
preventing an interruption of the French trade, to plant the standard of
Louis XIV in the beautiful country of the Senecas." 5 In a note following
the poem itself, Hosmer explained that "Yonnondio was a title originally
given by the Five Nations to M. de Montmagny, but became a style of
address in their treaties, by which succeeding Governor Generals of New
France were designated."'6
2. Yonnondio
[The sense of the word is lament for the aboriginea It is an Iroquois term; and has been
used for a personal name.]
A song, a poem of itself-the word itself a dirge,
Amid the wilds, the rocks, the storm and wintry night,
To me such misty, strange tableaux the syllables bailing up;
Yonnondo-I see, far in the west or north, a limitless ravine,
with plains and mountains dark,
I see swarms of stalwart chieftains, medicine-men, and warriors,
As flitting by like clouds of ghosts, they pass and are gone in the twilight,
(Race of the woods, the landscapes free, and the fallsl
No picture, poem, statement, passing them to the future:)
Yonnondiol Yonnondio!-unlimn'd they disappear;,
To-day gives place, and fades-the cities, farms, factories fade;
A muffled sonorous sound, a wailing word is borne through the air for a moment,
Then blank and gone and still, and utterly lost.
W. WHITMAN, Yonnondio, in LEAVES OF GRASS 524 (S. Bradley & H. Blodgett eds. 1958).
Yonnondio-a lament, but also a proper name--cannot be translated without damage to the
word itself and to the cultural structure of meaning that gives identity to the translatable content and
to the name. We incorporated Yonnondio into our title, to bring to mind just this problem. Thanks
to Jerry Creedon for reminding us of the poem and Wlad Godzich for suggesting we look at the
Masbpee case.
As Clifford Geertz has put it in the anthropological context:
"Translation," here, is not a simple recasting of others' ways of putting things in terms of
our own ways of putting them... but displaying the logic of their ways of putting them in
the locutions of ours; a conception which again brings it rather closer to what a critic does
to illumine a poem than what an astronomer does to account for a star.
C. GEERT-, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 10
(1983).
3. W. WHITMAN, supra note 2.
4. W. HOSMER, YONNONDIO, OR WARRIORS OF THE GENESEE: A TALE OF THE SEVEN-
TEENTH CENTURY (1844).
5. Id at v.
6. Id at 218.
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It is easy to understand that Whitman took "Yonnondio" to signify7
"Lament for the Aborigines"; if "Yonnondio" was indeed the word the
Iroquois used to address the state, then as Whitman says in his poem, its
mere mention "is itself a dirge." For the Iroquois, "Yonnondio" itself
took on new meaning as the relation to which it referred shifted. Even as
the word became a greeting, its meaning was different for the Iroquois
than for the French and other Europeans with whom the Iroquois had
contact. This cascade of meanings reflects the highly volatile system of
relations produced by contact between the Iroquois and the various
Europeans intent on "opening up" or "claiming" the "New World."
One still hears the Iroquois language, Onondaga, in place names de-
rived from it: Ohio ("Great River") or Ontario ("Great Lake"). Indian
history indeed is inscribed on the land of North America. Its inscription,
however, has faded for most Americans because the inscription exists
without any tie to the proper names that give these words significance.
The remnants of language attached to real places prompt romantic
images of America's pre-European past.8 The telling of this past (his-
tory), like all stories, is replete with meanings, and as with most narra-
tives, its very telling is an expression of power.
7. "Signify" is used here in both the technical and popular senses. "Signify" means the rela-
tionship between the sign "Yonnondio" and its referent. The sign may have several referents: the
proper name, the representative of the state, the loss of tribal autonomy. As Jonathan Culler notes,
the potential existence of a vast array of referents "does not mean that the notion of sign could or
should be scrapped: on the contrary, the distinction between what signifies and what is signified is
essential to any thought whatever." J. CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM
AFrER STRUCTURALISM 188 (1982).
Professor Gary Peller explains that '"[i]n the terminology of semiotics, the 'sign' is made up of
two parts, the 'signifier' which stands as a symbol in the social language for what is being repre-
sented, and the 'signified,' the concept or thing that is represented by the signifier." Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151, 1163 n.10 (1985) (examining the political
and metaphysical foundations of Amprican law and rejecting the ennui that has bedeviled much of
moderm interpretive jurisprudence).
8. For a general discussion of the ways in which language becomes detached from its historical
referents, see J.-F. LYOTARD, THE DIFFEREND: PHRASES IN DISPUTE (1988). By adopting non-
European names for places that are thoroughly westernized we are able to possess and domesticate a
past we did not fully control. We observe this process of domestication in many places. Take, for
example, American Civil War battle sites. The sanitization of one aspect of our unruly history was
highlighted in the Gettysburg Tower Case. Commonwealth v. National Gettysburg Battlefield
Tower, Inc., 454 Pa. 193, 311 A.2d 588 (1973). A group of developers planned to construct a 300-
foot tower overlooking one of the most revered battle sites in American history-a place that has
indeed become sacred in the lore of the American Civil War. In their zeal to build this tourist
attraction, however, these developers neglected to recognize that the power of the site itself is derived
from its human scale. Loss of that scale portended a concomitant loss of some of its power, some of
its meaning. Similar patterns have emerged in the southwest, though more slowly, as Spanish names
lose their mooring, and the difference is lost. See generally D. MONTEYANO, ANGLOS AND MEXI-
CANS IN THE MAKING OF TEXAS, 1836-1986 (1987) (a history of conflict and accommodation be-
tween Anglos and Mexicans in the development of Texas).
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The telling of stories holds an important role in the work of courts.
Within a society, there are specific places where most of the activities
making up social life within that society simultaneously are represented,
contested, and inverted. 9 Courts are such places. Like mirrors, they re-
flect where we are, from a space where we are not. Law, the mechanism
through which courts carry out this mirroring function, has a curious
way of recording a culture's practices of telling and listening to its sto-
ries. Such stories enter legal discourse in an illustrative, even exemplary,
fashion.
"Yonnondio"-the address, the salutation-became a medium
through which contending Indian and European cultures interacted.
The evolving meaning of this salutation reflected changing relations of
power as the Indians' early contact with European explorers themselves
evolved into contact with the states represented by those explorers.
Likewise, the land claim suits fied by various Tribes during the 1970s' °
served as a channel through which some Indians attempted to communi-
cate with the state-this time, through the medium of courts. In order
for the state to hear their claims, however, these Indians were forced to
speak in a formalized idiom of the language of the state-the idiom of
legal discourse. This paper analyzes one such land claim suit, Mashpee
Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 11 and the formalized address that it incorpo-
rated. What happens, we ask, when such claims receive a legal hearing?
We suggest that first they must be translated by means of examples that
law can follow-precedent, and examples that law can hear-evidence.
We should suspect that the legal coding 12 through which such trans-
lation is conducted highlights a problem inherent in the post-modem
9. See Foucault, Of Other Spaces, DIACRITICS, Spring 1986, at 22 (the text of a speech Fou-
cault delivered in March, 1967, translated by J. Miskowiec, in which Foucault describes the creation
of social space in terms of material spatial relations-places given their identities by ideas and ideolo-
gies that are projected on to them, like a courthouse or a brothel).
10. See generally P. BRODEUR, RESTITUTION: THE LAND CLAIMS OF THE MASHPEE, PAS-
SAMAQUODDY, AND PENOBSCOT INDIANS OF NEW ENGLAND (1985). During the late 1960s and
early 1970s, several Indian tribes pursued legal actions aimed at reclaiming land alienated from them
by various means during the 16th, 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries: the Passamaquoddy and Penob-
scot in Maine; the Gay Head Wampanoag in Massachusetts; the Narragansett in Rhode Island; the
Western Pequot, Schaghticot and Mohegan in Connecticut; the Oneida, Cayuga and St. Regis Mo-
hawk in New York; the Catawba in South Carolina; the Chitimacha in Louisiana; and the Mashpee
of Cape Cod in Massachusetts.
11. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,
592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
12. Roberta Kevelson explains the concept of "legal coding" in THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF
SIGNS 23-31 (1988) (applying semiotic theory, especially that of C.S. Peirce, to law). Kevelson's idea
of legal coding is that there is "no dominant legal system in any given society; there are only net-
works of legal subsystems." "[Llegal systems evolve through conflicting internal forces" within the
society as a whole. The legal system evolves and is coded as a result of "a dynamic exchange of
messages between legal and other social systems." Id. at 24.
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condition' 3-the confrontation between irreconcilable systems of mean-
ig produced by two contending cultures. The post-modem condition is
a crisis of faith in the grand stories that have justified our history and
legitimized our knowledge. The very idea of what we can know is unsta-
ble. The crisis in the law that emerged with the Legal Realists and the
attempts to reconstitute formalism-as the basis for survival of the "rule
of law"-also reflect our post-modern condition. In the case of the
Mashpee, the systems of meaning are irreconcilable: The politics of his-
torical domination reduced the Mashpee to having to petition their
"guardian" to allow them to exist, and the history of that domination has
determined in large measure the ways the Mashpee must structure their
petitions. The conflict between these systems of meaning-that of the
Mashpee and that of the state-is really the question of how can we
"know" which history is most "true."
Yet the difficulty facing the Mashpee in this case is not just that they
cannot find the proper "language"' 14 with which to-tell their story or cap-
ture the essence of the examples that would prove their claims. The
problem with conflicting systems of meaning is that there is a history and
social practice reflected and contained within the language chosen. To
require a particular way of telling a story not only strips away nuances of
meaning, but also elevates a particular version of events to a non-contin-
gent status. More than that, however, when particular versions of events
are rendered unintelligible, the corresponding counter-examples that
those versions represent lose their legitimacy. Those examples come un-
glued from both the cultural structure that grounds them and the legal
structure that would validate them. The existence of untranslatable ex-
amples renders unreadable the entire code of which they are a part, while
simultaneously legitimizing the resulting ignorance. This Essay exam-
ines the nature of that ignorance.
13. Here we reference the concept of "postmodemism" expressed in J.-F. LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (G. Bennington & B. Massumi trans.
1984), wherein Lyotard investigates both the control of information in the Western world and the
collapse of legitimizing forces in Western culture. The "modem" account of knowledge makes "an
explicit appeal to some grand narrative," id at xxiii, a meta-narrative that legitimates the endeavor.
The post-modem account views such meta-narratives with incredulity. This is not to say that mod-
ernists view the world as fully presentable in narrative. The modernist attempts to characterize the
world as ultimately unpresentable, while relying on a form of narrative presentation that remains
recognizable and that offers the reader solace. In contrast, the postmodernist incorporates the un-
presentable in the narrative itself. Id. at 71-82; see also Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach
to Law, 67 TEx. L. Rv. 1195, 1217 (1989).
14. See generally Peller, supra note 7, at 1160-70 (explaining how linguistic conventions sepa-
rate the speaker and the listener, necessitating the use of language available in the "linguistic com-
munity," which is common to both speaker and listener).
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"Ignorant," of course, merely means uninformed. The central prob-
lem addressed by this essay is whether the limitations of the legal idiom
permit one party truly to inform the other, or conversely, whether the
dimension of power hidden in the idiomatic structure of legal story-
telling forecloses one version in favor of another. Note that this Essay is
not the story of "different voices:"
[W]hen you are powerless, you don't just speak differently. A lot, you
don't speak. Your speech is not just differently articulated, it is si-
lenced. Eliminated, gone. You aren't just deprived of a language with
which to articulate your distinctiveness, although you are; you are de-
prived of a life out of which articulation might come. 15
The law does not permit the Mashpee's story to be particularized and
still be legally intelligible. By imposing specific "ethno-legal" categories
such as "Tribe" on the Mashpee, law universalizes their story. This uni-
versalizing process eliminates differences the dominant culture perceives
as destabilizing. Criticism of the imposition of cultura!/legal categories
on subcultures should not, however, be used to fetishize the idea of differ-
ence. Instead, the inability of the law to hear, or equally to weigh, cul-
turally divergent versions of "the truth" should be examined to help us
understand how social knowledge is constructed.
Similarly, the recounting of the Mashpee's travails in their attempt
to tell their story does not yield an object lesson in the open texture of
American pluralism. Some versions of reality are foreclosed, plain and
simple. The legal boundaries made apparent in the Mashpee's story re-
quire that they remain frozen in time: Cultural evolution itself is prohib-
ited for the Mashpee.
This Essay examines the nature of "telling" within the confines of
litigation: What constitutes proof and what constitutes authority; what
are the pragmatics of "legal" storytelling? Pragmatics in this context
might be analyzed best in terms of a game. Any game must have rules to
determine what is an acceptable move, but the rules do not determine all
available moves. Although the total content of acceptable moves is not
predetermined, the universe of potentially permissible moves is limited
necessarily by the structure of the game. All language, but especially
technical language, is a kind of game. What are the rules that govern
discourse in the legal idiom? What kind of knowledge is transmitted?
"[W]hat must one say in order to be heard, what must one listen to in
order to speak, and what role must one play ... to be the object of a
narrative[?]" 16
15. C. MACKiNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DIscouRsEs ON LIFE AND LAW 39 (1987)
(articulation of feminism as a critique of the gendered system of social hierarchy and social power).
16. J.-F. LYOTARD, supra note 13, at 21.
[Vol. 1990:625
TRANSLATING YONNONDIO
By highlighting the peculiar nature of legal discourse and comparing
it to other ways of telling and reading the Mashpee's history, we can
explore and make concrete the roles of power and politics in legal ration-
ality. The Mashpee case is especially well-suited to this investigation be-
cause it casts so starkly the problem of law as an artifact of culture and
power. Parts 117 and 1118 introduce this problem and outline the histori-
cal and legal dimensions of the Mashpee land claim. There is a powerful
historical and cultural context within which Native Americans operate,
much of it imposed. For Indians of the eastern seaboard, the longstand-
ing confrontation and association with Europeans have produced rela-
tions that are substantially different from those confronting the Western
and Great Plains Tribes. For a largely peaceful Tribe like the Mashpee,
this long association also has produced a history that intersects white
America at many points. The meaning of the events that mark these
intersections is unproblematic, so long as there is no dispute implicating
the legitimacy of the underlying structure of relations that has grown up
between the contending groups. The Mashpee land claim suit, however,
directly challenges the structure of those relations and the legitimacy of
meaning that supports it.
The following treatment of the Mashpee's story is presented from
historical and anthropological perspectives. In this way, the discussion
mirrors the manner in which evidence was presented at the trial of the
Mashpee's land claim. Part III melds the idioms of these two academic
discourses in an effort to illustrate the essentially hermeneutic task at
hand. 19 The task facing both parties was to give a particular meaning to
the facts presented. The normally difficult problem of assaying meaning
from events was complicated additionally because the court, through the
application of its rules, was attempting to mediate conflicting cultures
with conflicting systems of meaning. The court that heard the Mashpee's
case was faced with the problem of making "sense" out of the events
giving rise to the Tribe's suit. In doing so, the court purported to trans-
late the "description" provided by historians and anthropologists into
"meaning" enforced by the power of the state. Law was therefore the
tool used to define and interpret the meaning of specific events, although
in accomplishing this task it could not accommodate irreconcilable cul-
tural perspectives. The trial allowed no room for divergent cultural un-
derstandings, even the Mashpee's self-understanding.
The process of foreclosing certain kinds of interpretation illuminates
the way in which "principled, rational decisionmaking" merely obscures
17. See supra notes 1-16 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 23-39 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 40-60 and accompanying text.
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the political roots of certain versions of social life. The legal structure of
the issues allowed the court to evade the duty of explaining the virtues of
one version of cultural life over another. Thus, the description of "what
happened next" is viewed as an objective question, rather than one that
ought to be guided by an evolving set of inter-subjective relations. By
distinguishing a pre-literate from a post-literate phase in the life of the
Mashpee, for example, the court devalued the oral history of the
Mashpee where it conflicted with written documents, even though those
documents did not reflect the understandings of the Mashpee at the time
the documents were created.
The problem of deciding "what happened" is compounded by the
rules governing relevance. Part IV addresses the system of examples at
work in legal interpretation and explanation.20 By isolating the exem-
plary nature of the elements of legal rationality, this Part demonstrates
the essentially tautological structure of legal persuasion. The procedure
is revealed as self-elaborating: "[T]he conceptual structure hangs above
and dominates social being."' 21 The method of proof is shown to be a
form of idealism masquerading as hard-headed realism. This Part also
illustrates how a system of examples described as forming the content of
"rationality" privileges some stories over others, and, more importantly,
how that privilege is a reflection of the underlying distribution of social
power.
Finally, Part V demonstrates that there remain many ways to view
the substantive events at issue in the Mashpee trial.22 That both the
Tribe and the non-Indian residents of the town were litigants necessarily
colored their individual versions of the events. Apart from the parties,
however, there are significantly divergent explanations of the events that
escape the internal/external perspective problem that the trial placed in
high relief. This conflict of views suggests that faith in American plural-
ism requires a recognition of certain fundamentally irreconcilable fu-
tures. Not everything is possible, even though deferred conflict may lead
to the illusion that it is. This Essay illustrates that the choices contained
in the structure of law applied to the Mashpee case permitted only a
limited kind of cultural vision, one from the perspective of the dominant
culture. A pluralistic conception of justice may require the incorporation
of those conflicting views, but law, in this instance, may not be where
justice is found.
20. See infra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
21. E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY & OTHER ESSAYS 13 (1978) (criticizing Al-
thusserian structuralism for allowing categories to attain a primary role in relation to their material
referents, thereby creating precisely the system Marx recognized as idealism).
22. See infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text.
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II.
A. Looking Back at Indians and Indians Looking Back: The Case
In 1976 in Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee,2 3 the Indian commu-
nity at Mashpee on Cape Cod sued to recover tribal lands alienated 24
from them over the last two centuries in violation of the Indian Non-
Intercourse Act of 1790.25 The Non-Intercourse Act prohibits the trans-
fer of Indian tribal land to non-Indians without approval of the federal
government. The Tribe claimed its land had been taken from it, between
1834 and 1870, without the required federal consent. According to the
Mashpee, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had permitted the land
to be sold to non-Indians and had transferred common Indian lands to
the Town of Mashpee. The defendant, Town of Mashpee, answered by
denying that the plaintiffs, Mashpee, were a Tribe. Therefore, they were
outside the protection of the Non-Intercourse Act and were without
standing to sue.
As a result, the Mashpee first had to prove that they were indeed a
"Tribe." A forty-day trial then ensued on that threshold issue. The
Mashpee were required to demonstrate their tribal existence in accord-
ance with a definition adopted by the United States Supreme Court at the
turn of the century in Montoya v. United States: "By a 'tribe' we under-
stand a body of Indians of the same or a similar race, united in a commu-
nity under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular
though sometimes ill-defined territory. '2 6 This is a very narrow and par-
ticular definition. As Judge Skinner, who presided over the trial of the
Mashpee's claim, explained in his instructions to the jury: "Now, what is
the level of the burden of proof? I've said these matters need not be
determined in terms of cosmic proof. The plaintiff has the burden of
proving... if the [Mashpee] were a tribe." 27
23. 447 F. Supp. 940 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,
592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
24. "Alienated" was chosen because of its usual meaning-a conveyance that transfers title,
regardless of how the transaction occurs.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) (derived from Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 12, 4 Stat. 730). This
Act provides: "No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands.... from any Indian nation
or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or equity, unless the same be made by treaty or
convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution." Id. The original language read: "That no
person shall be permitted to carry on any trade or intercourse with the Indian tribes, without a
license for that purpose under the hand and seal of the superintendent of the department .. " Act
of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 137.
26. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
27. Record at 40:7 (Jan. 4, 1978), Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 427 F. Supp. 899 (D.
Mass. 1978) (No. Civ. A. No. 76-3190-S) [hereinafter Record] (instructions to jury on burden of
proof); see also Mashpee Tribe, 447 F. Supp. at 943.
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Judge Skinner agreed to allow expert testimony from various social
scientists regarding the definition of "Indian Tribe." By the closing days
of the trial, however, the judge had become frustrated with the lack of
consensus as to a definition:
I am seriously considering striking all of the definitions given by all of
the experts of a Tribe and all of their opinions as to whether or not the
inhabitants of Mashpee at any time could constitute a Tribe. I let it all
in on the theory that there was a professionally accepted definition of
Tribe within these various disciplines.
It is becoming more and more apparent that each definition is
highly subjective and idiosyncratic and generated for a particular pur-
pose not necessarily having anything to do with the Non-Intercourse
Act of 1790.28
In the end, Judge Skinner instructed the jury that the Mashpee had to
meet the requirements of Montoya-rooted in notions of racial purity,
authoritarian leadership, and consistent territorial occupancy-in order
to establish their tribal identity,29 despite the fact that Montoya itself did
not address the Non-Intercourse Act.
The case providing the key definition, Montoya, involved a company
whose livestock had been taken by a group of Indians. The company
sued the United States and the Tribe to which the group allegedly be-
longed under the Indian Depredation Act.30 This Act provided compen-
sation to persons whose property was destroyed by Indians belonging to
a Tribe. The theory underlying tribal liability is that the Tribe should be
responsible for the actions of its members. The issue in Montoya was
whether the wrong-doers were still part of the Tribe. The court found
they were not.
Beyond reflecting archaic notions of tribal existence in general, the
Montoya requirements incorporated specific perceptions regarding race,
leadership, community, and territory that were entirely allen to Mashpee
culture. The testimony revealed the Montoya criteria as generalized eth-
nological categories that failed to capture the specifics of what it means
to belong to the Mashpee people. 31 Because of this disjunction between
28. Record, supra note 27, at 36:189 (Dec. 28, 1977).
29. See id at 40:36 (Jan. 4, 1978).
30. Indian Depredation Act, ch. 538, 26 Stat. 851 (1891).
31. The questioning of Vernon Pocknett, a Mashpee Tribe member, illustrates the attempt to
impose certain preconceived notions of leadership upon the Mashpee Tribe:
Q: [What was it Mr. Mills did as chief?
A: What he did?
Q: Yes. And you said he gives advice.
A: Very good advice.
Q: He gives good advice, is that right?
A: Right.
Q: He doesn't issue any orders, does he?
A: No, no way.
[Vol. 1990:625
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the ethno-legal categories and the Mashpee's lived experience, the
Tribe's testimony and evidence never quite "signified"32 within the idiom
established by the precedent. After forty days of testimony, the jury
came up with the following "irrational" decision: The Mashpee were not
a Tribe in 1790, were a Tribe in 1834 and 1842, but again were not a
Q: The [Tribe] has no rules or regulations, does it?
A: Rules or regulations? That would come under way of life. No, we don't have rules or
regulations.
Record, supra note 27, at 3:191 (Oct. 19, 1977).
Jack Campisi, an ethno-anthropologist, attempted an alternate characterization of the concept
of tribal membership:
What happens is, as I suggested, this is a very close-knit population who lived together for
an extended period of time and pretty much knew everybody... But if an individual
comes in who has not been known by the community and asserts a birthright, then that
individual-it really depends upon members of the community being able from their
knowledge of the membership, being able to validate that.
Id. at 11:109 (Nov. 1, 1977).
James L. Axtell, an ethno-historian, described a notion of tribal membership that was not coex-
istent with "physical membership":
Q: Is it possible for Indians to walk away and leave a tribe, or are they in a tribe
forever, whether they want to be that way or not?
A: Well, that's not a simple question. One could walk out of the physical tribe, where it
was located, and still maintain membership in the tribe. On the other hand, one could
renounce one's tribal affiliation and yet you could never wipe out the blood line that estab-
lished you as a descendant of people who were members of that tribe ....
Id. at 8:63 (Oct. 25, 1977).
Jack Campisi attempted to explain Indian land use:
A: [Tihe concept of owning land in Fee Simple, generally speaking, is not a North
American Indian concept, one used the land, and when one ceased to use the land it
reverted.
Q: To whom?
A: To whoever came along and used the land after you.
Id at 11:130 (Nov. 1, 1977).
32. See supra note 7 (exploring the meaning of "signify"). As Jean-Frangois Lyotard
commented:
It is in the nature of a victim not to be able to prove that one has been done a wrong. A
plaintiff is someone who has incurred damages and who disposes of the means to prove it.
One becomes a victim if one loses these means. One loses them, for example, if the author
of the damages turns out directly or indirectly to be one's judge. The latter has the author-
ity to reject one's testimony as false or the ability to impede its publication. But this is only
a particular case. In general, the plaintiff becomes a victim when no presentation is possi-
ble of the wrong he or she says he or she has suffered. Reciprocally, the "perfect crime"
does not consist in killing the victim or the witnesses (that adds new crimes to the first one
and aggravates the difficulty of effacing everything), but rather in obtaining the silence of
the witnesses, the deafness of the judges, and the inconsistency (insanity) of the testimony.
You neutralize the addressor, the addressee, and the sense of the testimony; then every-
thing is as if there were no referent (no damages). If there is nobody to adduce the proof,
nobody to admit it, and/or if the argument which upholds it is judged absurd, then the
plaintiff is dismissed, the wrong he or she complains of cannot be attested. He or she
becomes a victim. If he or she persists in invoking this wrong as if it existed, the others
(addressor, addressee, expert commentator on the testimony) will easily be able to make
him or her pass for mad. Doesn't paranoia confuse the As if it were the case with the it is
the case?
J.-F. LYOTARD, supra note 8, at 8.
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Tribe in 1869 and 1870.33 The jury's finding was "irrational" because the
judge had instructed them that if they concluded that the Mashpee had
ever relinquished their Tribal status they could not regain it. Based on
the jury's findings, the trial court dismissed the Mashpee's claim.34
The Mashpee immediately challenged the trial court's dismissal on
several grounds. 35 The Tribe argued that the jury verdict presumed it
had disbanded voluntarily at some point-a presumption the Tribe al-
leged had never been proven. 36 Further, the Tribe alleged that the ver-
dict was entirely inconsistent with the trial court's instruction that once
the jury found tribal existence ceased at a given time, it could not find the
Tribe existed again at a later date.37 The First Circuit rejected the
Mashpee's assignments of error and affirmed the trial court's decision to
dismiss their claim.38 The United States Supreme Court subsequently
denied the Tribe's petition for certiorari, allowing the First Circuit's deci-
sion to stand.39
III.
Yonnondio-I see, far in the west or north, a limitless ravine,
with plains and mountains dark,
I see swarms of stalwart chieftains, medicine-men, and warriors,
As flitting by like clouds of ghosts, they pass and are gone in the
twilight
33. The decision was irrational, given Judge Skinner's instructions:
Because of the necessity of an historical continuity for the existence of a tribe as I have
tried to define it [in this case], once tribal status has been voluntarily abandoned, it is my
opinion that it is lost and cannot be revived. It cannot be created anew....
It is, I suppose, possible that by reason of circumstances, tribal existence be so sup-
pressed that it be in limbo for a period, that it not be manifest for a period without there
being an abandonment. If you find that there was, by reason of the activities in 1869, 1870,
a conscious abandonment of tribal status, then you would not be warranted in finding the
existence of a tribe in 1976.
Record, supra note 27, at 40:63-64 (Jan. 4, 1978) (instructions to jury). Given the finding that the
Mashpee did not constitute a Tribe in 1790, the jury could not find that they were a Tribe in 1834
and 1842, according to Judge Skinners instructions.
34. Mashpee Tribe v. Town of Mashpee, 447 F. Supp. 940, 950 (D. Mass. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
35. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979).
36. Id. at 585.
37. Id. at 590.
38. Id. at 594.
39. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
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The Baked and the Haf-Baked40
Whether the Mashpee are legally a Tribe is, of course, only half the
question. That the Mashpee existed as a recognized people occupying a
recognizable territory for well over three hundred years is a well-docu-
mented fact.41 In order to ascertain the meaning of that existence, how-
ever, an observer must ask not only what categories are used to describe
it, but also whether the categories adopted by the observer carry the
same meaning to the observed.42
The earliest structure used for communal Mashpee functions-a
colonial-style building that came to be known as "the Old
Meetinghouse"-was built in 1684.43 The meetinghouse was built by a
white man, Shearjashub Bourne, as a place where the Mashpee could
conduct their Christian worship. Shearjashub's father, Richard Bourne,
had preached to the Mashpee and oversaw their conversion to Christian-
ity almost a generation earlier. The Bourne family's early interest in the
Mashpee later proved propitious. The elder Bourne arranged for a deed
to be issued to the Mashpee to "protect" their interest in the land they
occupied. Confirmation of this deed by the General Court of Plymouth
Colony in 1671 served as the foundation for including "Mashpee Planta-
tion" within the protection of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As part of
the Colony, the Mashpee were assured that their spiritual interests, as
defined by their Christian overseers, as well as their temporal interests
would receive official attention. However, the impact of introducing the
symbology of property deeds into the Mashpee's cultural structure rever-
berates to this day. Whether the introduction of European notions of
private ownership into Mashpee society can be separated from either the
40. This subtitle is intended as a tongue-in-cheek reference to Claude Levi-Strauss' work, THE
RAW AND THE COOKED (1969). This structuralist account of ethnological categories presaged
much modem semiotic theory. Here, of course, the reference to the baked and the half-baked plays
on the theme of ethnological categories while, at the same time, invoking the popular pejorative
term for an ill-contrived story.
41. Paul Brodeur notes:
Mashpee was never really settled in any formal sense of the word. It was simply inhabited
by the Wampanoags and their Nauset relatives, whose ancestors had been coming there to
fish for herring and to gather clams and oysters since the earliest aboriginal times, and
whose descendants currently represent, with the exception of the Penobscots and the Pas-
samaquoddies of Maine, the largest body of Indians in New England.
P. BRODEUR, supra note 10, at 7-9; see also J. CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART 289 (1988) ("[The Mashpee] did
have a place and a reputation. For centuries Mashpee had been recognized as an Indian town. Its
boundaries had not changed since 1665, when the land was formally deeded to a group called the
South Sea Indians by the neighboring leaders Tookonchasun and Weepquish.").
The irony of this "documentation" is that either as journalism or as anthropology it recounts a
telling that is not documentation for purposes of the dispute.
42. See C. LfvI-STRAuss, supra note 40, at 5-6.
43. P. BRODEUR, supra note 10, at 11.
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protection the colonial overseers claim actually was intended or the
Mashpee's ultimate undoing is, of course, central to the meaning of
"ownership."
Colonial oversight quickly became a burden. In 1760, the Mashpee
appealed directly to King George III for relief from their British over-
lords. In 1763, their petition was granted. The "Mashpee Plantation"
received a new legal designation, granting the "proprietors the right to
elect their own overseers." 44 This change in the Tribe's relationship with
its newly arrived white neighbors did not last long, however. With the
coming of the Colonies' war against England and the founding of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, all previous protections of Mashpee
land predicated on British rule quickly were repealed, and the Tribe was
subjected to a new set of overseers with even more onerous authority
than its colonial lords had held. The new protectors were granted "op-
pressive powers over the inhabitants, including the right to lease their
lands, to sell timber from their forests, and to hire out their children to
labor."45
During this time the Mashpee were on their way toward becoming
the melange of "racial types" that ultimately would bring about their
legal demise two hundred years later.46 Colonists had taken Mashpee
wives, many of whom were widows whose husbands had died fighting
against the British. The Wampanoags, another southern Massachusetts
Tribe that suffered terrible defeat in wars with the European colonists,
had retreated and had been taken in by the Mashpee. Hessian soldiers
had intermarried with the Mashpee. Runaway slaves took refuge with
and married Mashpee Indians. The Mashpee became members of a
"mixed" race, and the names some of the Mashpee carried reflected this
mixture. What was clear to the Mashpee, if not to outside observers, was
that this mixing did not dilute their tribal status because they did not
define themselves according to racial type, but rather by membership in
their community. In an essay on the Mashpee in The Predicament of
Culture, 47 Professor Clifford explained that despite the racial mixing that
had historically occurred in the Mashpee community, since the Mashpee
did not measure tribal membership according to "blood," Indian identity
remained paramount. In fact, the openness to outsiders who wished to
become part of the tribal community was part of the community values
that contributed to tribal identity. The Mashpee were being penalized
44. Id. at 15.
45. Id.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
47. J. CLIFFORD, supra note 41, at 306-07.
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for maintaining their aboriginal traditions because they did not conform
to the prevailing "racial" definition of community and society.
In 1833, a series of events began that culminated in the partial resto-
ration of traditional Mashpee "rights." William Apes, an Indian
preacher who claimed to be descended from King Philip, a Wampanoag
chief, stirred the Mashpee to petition their overseers and the Governor of
Massachusetts for relief from the depredation visited upon them. What
offended Apes was the appropriation of the Mashpee's worshipping
ground by white Christians. In response to the imposition of a white
Christian minister on their congregation, they had abandoned the
meetinghouse in favor of an outdoor service conducted by a fellow In-
dian. The petition Apes helped draft began, "we, as a Tribe, will rule
ourselves, and have the right to do so, for all men are born free and
equal, says the Constitution of the country. '48 What is particularly im-
portant about this challenge is that it asserted independence within the
context of the laws of the state of Massachusetts. The Massachusetts
Governor rejected this appeal and the Mashpee's attempt at unilateral
enforcement of their claims resulted in the arrest and conviction of
Apes.4
9
The appeal of Apes' conviction, however, produced a partial resto-
ration of the Tribe's right of self-governance and full restoration of its
right to religious self-determination, for the Tribe was returned to its
meetinghouse. When the white former minister tried to intervene, he
was removed forcibly and a new lock was installed on the meetinghouse
doors. By 1840, the Mashpee's right to worship was secured. 50
Control of the land remained a critical issue for the Mashpee. By
late in the 17th century, the area surrounding the homes and land of the
"South Sea Indians" 51 had been consolidated and organized into a per-
manent Indian plantation.5 2 The Mashpee's relationship to this land,
48. P. BRODEUR, supra note 10, at 17.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 18.
51. In earlier times, the Mashpee were known as "South Sea Indians" because they made their
home near Nantucket Sound, which the Dutch called the South Sea.
52. At the trial, the evolution of the Mashpee community was explained expressly in terms of
its legal relation to the colony and later the Commonwealth:
[Prior to 1675, the Mashpee community] seems to have been literally an Indian plantation,
that is to say, it was a plantation organized in the necopic [sic] sense like other plantations
in other parts of the State.
A plantation being in a sense a town in being, a town in becoming a town of the
future, which at this point was not yet incorporated. It was an Indian plantation, which
meant that certain special provisions had been established to accommodate the fact that
the Indians did not speak English by and large and were in the process of transition from
their aboriginal state to persons who were familiar with the process of English law in the
English court system, so it was, essentially, a transitional community which was formerly
Vol. 1990:625]
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however, remained legally problematic for the Commonwealth. In 1842,
Massachusetts determined that the land was to be divided among indi-
vidual Mashpee Tribe members, but their power over it was closely cir-
cumscribed; they could sell it only to other members of the Tribe. The
"plantation" could tax the land, but the land could not be taken for non-
payment of those taxes. In 1859, a measure was proposed to permit the
Mashpee to sell land to outsiders and to make the Mashpee "full citi-
zens" of the Commonwealth. This proposal was rejected by the Tribe's
governing council. In 1870, however, the Mashpee were "granted"
rights to alienate their property as "full-fledged citizens" and their land
was organized by fiat into the town of Mashpee. 53
It was the land that had moved out of Indian control, eleven thou-
sand acres of undeveloped land estimated to be worth fifty million dol-
lars, that the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council54 sued to reclaim in
1976. Some of the land had been lost in the intervening years, and more
was in danger of being lost or reduced to non-exclusive occupancy. The
Council based its claim on the 1790 Non-Intercourse Act,55 which pro-
under English law, and at the higher levels all appeals ran to the same courts to which
appeals from English towns went.
Record, supra note 27, at 35:64-65 (Dec. 27, 1977) (Professor Hutchins). James Clifford describes
the nature of (and ownership under) the plantation system,
Once the South Sea Indian Plantation had been established, its inhabitants' claim to their
land rested on a written deed and on English law rather than on any aboriginal sover-
eignty. Like other "plantations" in New England, the community at Mashpee was a joint-
ownership arrangement by a group of "proprietors." Under English law proprietors were
licensed to develop a vacant portion of land, reserving part for commons, part for the
church, and part for individual holdings. All transfers of land were to be approved collec-
tively. This plantation-proprietary form, as applied to early Cape Cod settlements.., was
intended to evolve quickly into a township where freemen held individual private property
and were represented in the General Court of the colony. The white plantations around
Mashpee did evolve directly into towns. From the late seventeenth century on their com-
mon lands were converted into private individual holdings in fee simple. Mashpee fol-
lowed the same course, but more slowly. As late as 1830 its lands were the joint property
of proprietors.
J. CLiFFoRD, supra note 41, at 19-20.
53. P. BRODEUR, supra note 10, at 19-20.
54. In an effort to obtain federal grants offered to American Indians, the Mashpee incorporated
a tribal council-The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc.-in 1974. The Tribal Council be-
came the official business and legal mechanism of the Tribe. Id. at 38. Hazel A. Oakley, a Tribal
Council officers, testified as follows:
Q: What does the Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Council, Inc., of which you are the
membership chairman, do?
A: It's the administrative part of the Mashpee tribe.
Q: What do you mean by "the administrative part of the Mashpee tribe"?
A: Well, it does administrative work for the tribe, like making proposals to get funds for
its people, and its purpose was to acquire land for its people and bring back its culture to
its people.
Record, supra note 27, at 2:121-22 (Oct. 18, 1977).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988); see supra note 25 (quoting the relevant provisions of the Act).
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hibits the alienation of Indian lands56 without federal approval. The
Non-Intercourse Act applies to transactions between Indians and non-
Indians, and, despite its inherent paternalism, serves to protect tribal
integrity.
The Non-Intercourse Act applied only if the Mashpee had retained
their "tribal identity" (defined, however, by the white man's rules of the
game) from the mid-17th century until they filed their land claim action
in 1976. In order to fall within the scope of the Act's protection, the
Mashpee had to prove first that they were indeed a "Tribe" and that their
status as such had not changed throughout this period. If the Mashpee
were no longer a "Tribe" (or if they never had constituted a "Tribe" in
the first place), the protection provided by the Non-Intercourse Act
evaporated. If, however, the Indians retained their tribal status, then the
transactions that resulted in the loss of their village were invalid. At the
very heart of the dispute was whether the Mashpee were "legally" a peo-
ple and thus entitled to legal protection.5 7
Many of the facts underlying the Mashpee's suit were not disputed.
What the parties fought about was the meaning of "what happened."-58
Seen from the perspective of the Mashpee, the facts that defined the Indi-
ans as a Tribe also invalidated the transactions divesting them of their
lands. From the perspective of the property owners in the Town, how-
ever, those same acts proved that the Mashpee no longer existed as a
separate people. How, then, is an appropriate perspective to be chosen?
As told by the defendants, the Mashpee's story was one about "a small,
mixed community fighting for equality and citizenship while abandoning,
by choice or coercion, most of its aboriginal heritage." 59
Using the same evidence, the plaintiffs told a very different story. It
was the story of cultural survival: "[T]he residents of Mashpee had man-
aged to keep alive a core of Indian identity over three centuries against
enormous odds. They had done so in supple, sometimes surreptitious
56. Under the Non-Intercourse Act, protected "Indian lands" are the lands a Tribe claims title
to on the basis of prior possession or ownership. See 25 U.S.C. § 194 (1988). Section 194 provides:
In all trials about the right of property in which an Indian may be a party on one side, and
a white person on the other, the burden of proof shall rest upon the white person, whenever
the Indian shall make out a presumption of title in himself from the fact of previous posses-
sion or ownership.
Id.
57. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988) (referring to "Indian nation" and "tribe of Indians" as those
covered by statute).
58. "The jury's problem was not so much weighing conflicting evidence as choosing between
plaintiff's and defendant's interpretation of the historical data." Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 589 n.14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
59. J. CLIFFoRD, supra note 41, at 302.
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ways, always attempting to control, not reject, outside influences." 60
Which of the two conflicting perspectives is the "proper" one from which
to assess the facts underlying the Mashpee's claim? The answers pro-
vided by the courts that considered the Mashpee's claims exemplify both
the use and abuse of examples in American law. As the next Part illus-
trates, the exemplary nature of legal argument is bounded by the rules
that control the substantive demonstration of the issues in dispute and by
the authoritative use of previously decided cases. Demonstration and au-
thority are two ways in which examples are used to structure legal under-
standing. Yet the choice of examples is not a neutral process; it always
involves adoption of a substantive perspective. The abuse of example
arises when the substantive perspective that is authoritatively adopted is
treated as though it arose naturally.
IV.
(Race of the woods, the landscapes free, and the fallsl
No picture, poem, statement, passing them to the future)
A. Exempli Gratia
Two closely related kinds of examples seem to be at work in legal
discourse. First, there is the authoritative example-that which deter-
mines whether or not one may proceed toward obtaining a legal remedy
for a perceived injustice. Precedent, even in the context of our statutory
age,61 is the cardinal manifestation of the authoritative example. A stat-
ute such as the Non-Intercourse Act may be a source of law, but courts,
using a variety of common law techniques, ultimately determine the
meaning of that statute.62 The role of authoritative examples thus is two-
fold, specifying the outer limits of a particular legal pronouncement and,
at the same time, establishing a foundation for subsequent interpretations
of those limits. This bifurcated function allows legal authority to appear
as though it were timeless. The example from the past is merged with a
new example from the present: Linearity is redefined as simultaneity.63
The past is always present in the form of the authoritative example.
60. Id
61. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 165 (1982) (discussing
the problems of adjudication in the face of increasingly detailed legislative attempts to control all
relevant authority).
62. See Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning 42 STAN. L. REv.
321 (1990) (arguing that in order to understand how judges interpret statutes, the observer must look
at the techniques of practical reason the courts apply in hard cases).
63. See Greenhouse, Just in Time: Temporality and the Cultural Legitimation of Law, 98 YALE
L.J. 1631, 1640 (1989). As Greenhouse explains:
[Vol. 1990:625
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Precedents accumulate as a "present body of law," yet the fact of ac-
cumulation leaves the body forever present, yet forever incomplete.
The second kind of example at work in legal discourse might be
labeled "explanatory." An explanatory example is a statement or ex-
hibit, either real or interpretive,64 taken as evidence of the sufficiency of a
legal claim. In contrast to authoritative examples, which govern whether
or not a particular legal claim can be pursued at all, explanatory exam-
ples "flesh out" legal claims, giving them substance within the confines
established by the controlling authoritative example. Explanatory exam-
ples must be constructed to showcase the reality being tested by a given
legal claim in terms recognized by the governing authoritative examples.
Explanatory examples may both give meaning to the facts that underlie a
legal claim and provide a basis for distinguishing that claim from appar-
ently relevant, but undesirable, authoritative examples.
There are, of course, rules governing the use of either type of exam-
ple.65 The essence of these rules is the predictive power they yield. Their
predictive value resides in their power to inform legal actors how a given
dispute will be resolved. However, the rules themselves are absolutely
determinative only of the actual dispute to which they are applied.
Hence, their predictive potential necessarily involves something of a
gamble. When seeking an authoritative example, an attorney or a judge
always must determine at the outset whether the facts of some previously
The common law, which developed at this period, in some respects reflects perfectly a logic
of linear time, in its reliance on precedent, its commitment to reform, and its acknowledg-
ment of individual persons and rights. But the common law also involves larger claims
beyond linear time. Reasoning by analogy to precedent creates afalse historicity in that it
perpetually reclaims the past for the present: in theory, a dispute in 1989 can be resolved
by reference to cases from 1889 or 1389. "The law" thus accumulates, but it never passes;
at any instant, it represents a totality. It is by definition complete, yet, its completeness
does not preclude change. It is a human achievement, yet, by its reversible and lateral
excursions, and by its collective voice, it is not identifiably the product of any particular
individual or group. Symbolically, it stands at the border between the two great zones of
Indo-European thinking-the human-made (anthropogonic) and the divine (cosmo-
gonic)-and is nourished by the indeterminacy of the distinction between events in linear
time and possibilities (all-times).
Id.
64. The distinction between "real" and "interpretive" is necessarily problematic, since the idea
of "real" evidence might be understood as evidence with some non-contingent meaning. That infer-
ence is not intended here. Perhaps an illustration will help. Some conduct, say refusing to hire
someone because of her race, is per se violative of a legal standard. So testimony such as "yeah, I
wasn't going to hire a black woman," provides "real" evidence to support an intentional discrimina-
tion claim. Without such a "smoking gun," however a court must sort through other explanatory
examples in order to give meaning to a whole series of events, each with problematic content. Inter-
pretive examples, in contrast to real examples, provide a court with grounds for determining
whether the conduct complained of is indeed proscribed.
65. See Frickey, Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases Reconsidering National League of Cities,
2 CONST. COMMENTARY 123 (1985) (discussing the flexibility of the doctrine of stare decisis, espe-
cially in the face of decisions that have proven to be wrong).
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resolved dispute are sufficiently similar to the controversy at issue to dic-
tate how the parties to that controversy ought to be treated. In order to
make such a determination, the judge or attorney must closely examine
the factual setting of the prior case-the legal precedent serving as au-
thoritative example-for similarity, difference, and importance relative
to the present dispute.66
In a system that uses previously decided cases as the foundation for
authoritative statements, at least two questions of fact are central to
resolving a given dispute. First, what facts may be recognized as proof of
the legal claim? Second, what facts are recognized as legally determina-
tive in the search for an authoritative example-in short, what facts
count in this search? Determining which facts are critical and which
interpretation of the facts is most like the authoritative interpretation is a
continuing process. The translation of the raw material of life into le-
gally cognizable claims is at the heart of the lawyer's art, but like any
other extremely stylized art form, the artist's creativity is constrained by
the structure of the project.
The centrality of the meaning of facts, in the sense of "what hap-
pened," recurs constantly. From precedent we get two additional kinds
of examples: 1) the example of authoritative fact patterns, and 2) the
example of authoritative interpretations of those fact patterns. Judicial
opinions typically begin with a statement of the facts in dispute. That
statement usually presages the conclusion, but the precedential import of
the facts changes as the meaning of the case changes over time. 67 The
simple conclusion that a court reached may not be the proposition for
which the case is cited. The conclusory factual statement ultimately
loses its mooring in the specific case. Thus, which facts are authoritative
will change as the case is made to fit into an evolving system of relations
that gives it meaning. 68 In cases in which different courts try to answer
the same legal question, creating or discovering a set of authoritative in-
terpretations lies at the heart of the attorney's- task. These interpreta-
tions must be used to frame the raw material of a given case so as to
suggest it is sufficiently similar to previous cases or to some articulated
66. Two important points are elided here: The first is a justification for giving a precedent-as
prior decided case-dispositive force, the second is the question of how to go about determining
which facts are important.
67. See generally Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication, 83 YALE L.. 1553 (1974) (discussing
the relationship between relevance and legitimacy).
68. The dynamic process of interpretation and "meaning creation" is central to the "law mak-
ing" role of courts. See G. CALABREsI, supra note 61, at 1-33; Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and
the Supreme Court Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169
(1968).
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statutory standard, in order to justify a court's listening to the claim and
subsequently granting the desired relief.
At the core of such an enterprise, of course, is the recognition that
there never are identical cases, only cases that are more similar or differ-
ent. However, articulating a claim in terms of an authoritative example
provides at least an initial foundation for determining the relative impor-
tance of specific facts. In this way, legal precedent in the role of authori-
tative example comes to life both as a fact-filled instance and as a fact-
denuded rule. The existence of the authoritative example as rule suggests
to the legal actor how the explanatory examples-the facts of the case-
must be arranged. Exploration of the authoritative precedent must in-
clude both a sense of what the case "stands for," that is, what "rule of
law" may be extracted from it, and a sense of what "actual facts" were
essential to the expression of that rule. Both these functions are critical
for a legal system that is predicated on prior determinations which are to
be viewed by the participants in that system as timeless yet historically
grounded. This is what is meant by saying that a precedent is "fact-
filled"-it is grounded in a concrete situation. Part of its legitimizing
power comes from the rootedness of the decision, but its authoritative
logical power comes from the statement of the rule that emerges from the
decision. This rule is "fact-denuded," for it ultimately does not depend
upon the particular dispute that gave rise to the law suit to have persua-
sive power.
Intuitively, one assumes that everything potentially helpful to telling
the story behind a given legal claim ought to be allowed in as part of the
explanation. The reality of the legal process requires, however, that the
story be told in accordance with a set of rules designed to protect the
integrity of a subsequent decision as precedent or authoritative example.
Further, the rules that limit notions of relevance to the authoritative
commands also guide the structuring of the presentation.
B. The Rules of the Game: Telling a "Relevant" Story
The rules governing how one tells a story in court are supposed to
protect the court from wasting its time by listening to immaterial infor-
mation or testimony that might confuse or prejudice the ultimate deci-
sionmakers about what they are supposed to be deciding. These rules
turn on the legal concept of "relevance."
Typically, a legal claim is composed of elements that each must be
proven independently. "Relevant" evidence is a statement or exhibit that
tends to demonstrate the relationship between a factual assertion and a
particular element of a legal claim. According to the Federal Rules of
Evidence: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
Vol. 1990:625]
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make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determina-
tion of the action more probable or less probable than it would be with-
out the evidence."' 69 Thus, "relevance," the foundation for rules
permitting the introduction of evidence, controls and is controlled by the
existence of other facts, which themselves are controlled by the substan-
tive standard or statute being litigated. Relevance is the guide, but the
question remains: Relevant to what? Treating relevance as though it
were a neutral analytic category takes our attention away from the sub-
stantive standard being disputed because it requires that the judge mak-
ing the relevance determination treat the substantive standard as a given.
In cases like Mashpee, the underlying standard is often the heart of the
dispute. Re-read the definition. Relevance is a probability determina-
tion. The judge is to ask herself: "If I let this evidence in, will it add any
probitive value to the facts we already know?" This inquiry begs the
question of whether the "facts" already admitted are those that ought to
be in.
The legal concept of relevance empowers a court to approve or dis-
approve certain narrative elements of a party's story. A court's eviden-
tiary rulings, however, do not control truth, but rather translate it into
the terms of the substantive statute or standard at issue. The truth value
of a particular fact within the confines of legal discourse, therefore, is
directly related to whether it explicates the substantive claim being adju-
dicated. The issue being litigated is the measure of truth. Remember
Judge Skinner's frustration at the testimony of the various "experts" con-
cerning the definition of "Tribe." He had fully expected to consider
some "objective" or, at minimum, generally accepted, definition of this
ethno-legal category. Finding no agreement, Judge Skinner turned to a
legal standard that was completely acontextual (as well as profoundly
ethnocentric) by using Montoya to assess the Mashpee's claim to tribal
status. Judge Skinner translated, via Montoya, the lived experience of the
Mashpee into an objective, acontextual legal category.
The process of legal storytelling and relevance determination is
more like a gathering of material for an index70 than the telling of a
classic narrative. Facts are assembled to tell a story whose conclusion is
determined by others. Each fact must point to the next, not in a tempo-
69. FED. R. EVID. 401; see also McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 544 (E. Cleary 3d ed.
.1984) ('In sum, relevant evidence is evidence that in some degree advances the inquiry.").
70. According to Kevelson, "In semiotic terms the index is nothing but a sign, or sign system,
pointing to topics regarded as significant to the indexer. Thus an index, like a code in any other
system, is never complete." R. KEVELsO N, supra note 12, at 137. The point here is that legal
storytelling is more akin to the index of a book than to the text of that book. Like an index, the facts
constituting a legal story indicate the places one might turn to discover information without actually
supplying that information.
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ral sense, but rather only in the sense dictated by the substantive stan-
dard being litigated. The determinations of relevance-what can be
admitted as evidence-locate the court as the indexer: The one who de-
termines significance. The story told by the parties must point back con-
stantly to the story told by the court and the precedents, which, of
course, are merely the stories deemed acceptable by previous courts. By
structuring legal storytelling in this way, questions of power, perspective,
and value are evaded.
So what kind of story can be told within the confines of legal dis-
course? Let us turn to the story of the Mashpee Indians and listen to the
story they tell about themselves and the story that is told about them,
and then decide which story makes more sense.
C. Law Looks: Documentary Evidence
There is, then, an incommensurability between popular narrative
pragmatics, which provide immediate legitimation, and the language
game known to the West as the question of legitimacy--or rather, le-
gitimacy as a referent in the game of inquiry. Narratives, as we have
seen, determine criteria of competence and/or illustrate how they are
to be applied. They thus define what has the right to be said and done
in the culture in question, and since they are themselves part of that
culture, they are legitimated by the simple fact that they do what they
do.7
1
In response to the Mashpee's claims, attorneys for the Town of
Mashpee argued that the Tribe lacked racial purity, that it failed to re-
tain a sufficient degree of self-government. It exercised little if any "sov-
ereignty" over specific territory; it maintained no perceivably coherent
sense of "community," and therefore was not a Tribe as defined by the
Supreme Court in Montoya. 72 The defense's main witness, Francis
Hutchins, a historian, offered five days of exhaustive testimony.73
Although he and the Mashpee referred to more or less the same docu-
ments, his positivistic74 account of the Mashpee's history left no room to
suggest that certain land deeds in fact reflected white, rather than Indian,
notions of land ownership. The very acceptance by the court and the
witnesses of the symbology of deeds presupposed a certain structure for
the Mashpee story. This structure, framed with the European indicia of
ownership, was asserted by the defense as the only basis for the Tribe's
71. J.-F. LYOTARD, supra note 13, at 23.
72. Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901).
73. See Record, supra note 27, at 34 (Dec. 21, 1977), 35 (Dec. 22, 1977), 36 (Dec. 28-29, 1977),
38 (Dec. 30, 1977).
74. The implication of characterizing Hutchins' testimony as "positivist" is that the recounting
did little more than specify "what happened" from a pseudo-objective perspective. There was no
inquiry into the validity of how Hutchins might know "what happened."
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claims. In doing so, defendant's counsel translated the Tribe's claims
into terms foreign to the Mashpee. This rhetorical move stripped the
land claim of nuances that deeds could not replace. The deeds not only
reconstituted the Tribe's basic claim, they also temporalized it; deeds set
it apart from the evolving tradition of the Indians' relationship to their
physical surroundings, and, at once, both elevated and debased their rela-
tionship to the land.75
With regard to political leadership, the defendants' historian found
scant historical traces of Indian government at Mashpee.76 The court
apparently did not recognize any irony in the defense's attack on the
Mashpee's claim of "self-government." According to the defendants, the
Mashpee could be "self-governed" only if the Tribe adopted political
forms susceptible to documentary proof. Unfortunately, the Tribe did
not see fit to create that kind of proof of its political existence, since the
court was asking for evidence of the type of political life that white
Europeans, but not the Mashpee, recognized as legitimate. The Mashpee
tried to point out that what was "appearing" as a "lack" or "gap" in the
defendants' account of their history was something that they simply
75. In his testimony, Professor Hutchins spoke of the "breakdown" of the Mashpee commu-
nity, owing to its "choice" to remain on Cape Cod, rather than being relocated to the Western
United States when "offered the opportunity" to do so in the 1700s. What Hutchins failed to com-
prehend, however, is that the command, "If you want a land base, go west," completely misperceives
the Mashpee's fundamental sense of place. The irony, of course, is that the Tribe's culturally-defined
relationship to the land was interpreted in light of Euro-American standards. As Bruce Chatwin
writes in another context:
White men.., made the common mistake of assuming that, because the Aboriginals were
wanderers, they could have no system of land tenure. This was nonsense. Aboriginals, it
was true, could not imagine territory as a block of land hemmed in by frontiers: but rather
as interlocking network of "lines" or "ways through."
B. CHATWIN, THE SONGLINES 56 (1987) (exploration of Australian Natives' understanding of time,
place, and identity).
76. See, _g., Record, supra note 27, at 36:47-48 (Dec. 28, 1977). Hutchins testified that be-
tween 1666 and 1870 no Indian government existed:
Q: From the period of time in 1666, when the sachem of [manomet] relinquished his
interests, until the time that New Plymouth Colony became joined with Massachusetts
Bay Colony, did you observe any governmental structure in the Mashpee community
other than that established by the laws of New Plymouth Colony?
A: No.
Q: During the period of time when or immediately following the joining of New
Plymouth Colony with Massachusetts Bay Colony, up through the time of the
Revolutionary War, did you observe any governmental structure in the Mashpee
community other than that established by the laws of the Province of Massachusetts
Bay?
A: No.
Q: During the period of time from the Revolutionary War through 1870, did you
observe any government in the community other than that established by the laws of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?
A: No.
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would not have recorded in written form. 77 Within the idiom of docu-
mentary evidence as written record, because the Mashpee Indian culture
is rooted in large measure on the passing of an oral record, their history
could only signify silence.78 The commonplace view, replicated in the
process of legal proof, is that "facts" only have meaning to the extent
that they represent something "real." The stories that members of the
Mashpee Tribe told were stories that legal ears could not hear. Thus the
legal requirements of relevance rendered the Indian storytellers mute and
the culture they were portraying invisible. The tragedy of power was
manifest in the legally mute and invisible culture of those Mashpee Indi-
ans who stood before the court trying to prove that they existed.79
V.
Yonnondio
Yonnondio! Yonnondio!-unlimn'd they disappear;
To-day gives place, and fades-the cities, farms, factories fade;
A muffled sonorous sound, a wailing word is borne through the air
for a moment,
Then blank and gone and still, and utterly lost.
We are doubtless deluding ourselves with a dream when we think that
equality and fraternity will someday reign among human beings with-
out compromising their diversity.... For one cannot truly enjoy the
other, identifying with him, and yet at the same time remain
different.80
77. Vine Deloria, Jr., an attorney, author, and Indian affairs consultant, testified:
[Y]ou don't really study tribes. You work with the people to help them prepare the best
understanding you can of what the current problems are, how they got into the situation
they got into. In the course of that you talk with a great many Indians. A lot of times they
remember things that are not in the ordinary train of documents that your standard eco-
nomic scholar would run across. So in checking the oral testimony, oral tradition of the
people, then that gives you additional leads as to where you can find other sources to fill in
the history. And there's no really good history on any tribe in the country.
Record, supra note 27, at 16:109 (Nov. 9, 1977).
78. The cultural bias in favor of written, as opposed to oral, history resounded throughout the
trial of the Mashpee's land claim suit. Take, for example, the testimony of defense witness Francis
Hutchins, a political scientist and historian, regarding his method of researching Indian history:
"All the materials which the historian uses when you are dealing with a historical period, you can't
pick and choose, you have to use what you can find. And I have tried to look at every piece ofpaper
that survives from that period relating to the subject." Record, supra note 27, at 34:59-60 (Dec. 21,
1977) (emphasis added).
79. "It is important to remember that the voices to which power responds must be those that it
can hear." Torres & Brewster, Judges and Juries: Separate Moments in the Same Phenomenon, 4
LAW & INEQUALITY 171, 181 (1986) (discussing the problems feminism has encountered in search-
ing for a voice with which to participate in legal discourse).
80. C. LvI-STRAuss, THE VIEw FROM AFAR 24 (J. Neugroschel & P. Hoss trans. 1985).
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What were the underlying structures or categories guiding the deter-
mination of what evidence in the Mashpee trial was deemed "mate-
rial"-that is, within the confines of the legally defined dispute?81 In
order to construct an answer, it is necessary to examine two other
problems underlying the materiality of the evidence offered by the de-
fense. First, in claiming blood as a measure of identity, the defense ar-
gued (to the all-white jury) that "black intermarriage made the
Mashpees' proper racial identification black instead of Indian."82 Be-
cause of the racial composition of the community, that the jury would be
composed exclusively of white people virtually was guaranteed by the
voir dire in which prospective jurors were asked whether they were
themselves Indian, had any known Indian relatives, or had ever been
identified with organizations involved in "Indian causes."'8 3 White inter-
marriage was mentioned only in passing.84
81. "Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for which the evidence is offered
and the issues in the case. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition which is not a matter
in issue, the evidence is immaterial." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 69, § 185, at 541,
82. Petition for Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at 11,
Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.) (No. 79-62), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. The United States submitted extensive evidence of racial
integration within the Mashpee community:
We do know in many instances the geographic area from which both the Indians and the
Negroes came, who came to Mashpee. So it's quite clear that quite apart from the question
of Indian blood, the Indian blood which many of these people had was not local Indian
blood.
Record, supra note 27, at 36:18-19.
[By 1790, a] great many from a great many places and racial and cultural backgrounds had
entered the community... not only through marriage, but also by coming as individuals or
as families to the community. Mashpee by this time had already become what it has re-
mained in subsequent years, a truly remarkable non-white melting pot.
Id. at 36:137.
83. For example, the Record contains the following exchange during voir dire questioning of
William Brassill:
The Court: Do you, yourself, have any Indian ancestry that you know of?
Mr. Brassilh No.
The Court: Do you feel that the Indians as a group have been unfairly treated in the
past?
Mr. Brassil: Well, from what I know of the history in some cases, yes, I do.
The Court: Do you feel any personal responsibility to this that you have any obligation
to right these ancient wrongs?
Mr. Brassil: No.
The Court: Have you ever been identified with any organization involved in Indian
causes?
Mr. Brassill: No.
The Court: Have you or any member of your immediate family or any close friend ever
been employed by a government agency dealing with Indian affairs?
Mr. Brassill: No.
The Court: All right, the juror may be seated as juror No. 2.
Record, supra note 27, at 1:21-22. One notes, of course, that this juror was not questioned regarding
any affiliation, past or present, that might prejudice him against Indians or "Indian causes."
84. Even the slightest sensitivity to the racial history of the United States makes apparent the
racial taxonomy being imposed here. The defense affected a purely external view of the process of
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Second, "the trial court instructed the jury that the tribe could ter-
minate through social or cultural assimilation of 'English forms' and
'English labels.' ",85 The court interpreted Mashpee adaptation to the
dominant culture, necessary for their survival as an independent people,
as proof the Tribe had surrendered its identity. That interpretation in-
corporates a dominant motif in the theory and practice of modem Amer-
ican pluralism. 86  Ethnic distinctiveness often must be sacrificed in
exchange for social and economic security.
In their appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit, 87 the Mashpee argued that "integration and assimilation have
expressly been held insufficient to destroy tribal rights."88 Notions of
social and cultural assimilation, such as those upon which the defense
relied, impute reified 89 social standards to Indian communities that deny
intermarriage and assimilation-not just any external view, but a racially white external view. The
internal perspectives, within the tactical stance adopted by the defense, were irrelevant. See, eg.,
Torres, Local Knowledge, Local Color: Critical Legal Studies and the Law of Race Relations, 25 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1043 (1988); Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758.
85. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 82, at 15-16 (emphasis added); see also Mashpee Tribe,
592 F.2d at 586 (addressing trial court's instructions to jury regarding the adoption of English forms
and English labels).
86. See Torres, supra note 84 (arguing, in part, that cultural pluralism as presently defined in
American culture reflects systemic inequalities).
87. Mashpee Tribe, 592 F.2d at 575.
88. The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 756-57 (1867) (character of tribal organization
not affected by actions of the state; change can only come through treaty or voluntary abandonment
of tribal organization); Petition for Certiorari, supra note 82, at 16. See also United States v. Hol-
liday, 70 U.S (3 Wall.) 407, 408-10, 417-20 (1866) (federal decision to recognize a Tribe is political
decision not subject to judicial review); Joint Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528
F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975) (lack of official federal recognition does not preclude tribal status for some
purposes); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Moe, 392 F. Supp. 1297, 1315 (D. Mont. 1975)
(changes in tribal status can only be accomplished by treaty or voluntary abandonment of tribal
status), aff'd, 425 U.S. 463 (1976).
89. Reification is a term that has generated an impressive amount of commentary, beginning
with Hegel, through Marx, to Weber, and Lukics. The phenomenon, as I mean it to apply here,
might be explained in the following way: "Its basis is that a relation between people takes on the
character of a thing and thus acquires a 'phantom objectivity,' an autonomy that seems so strictly
rational and all-embracing as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between
people." G. LuKAcs, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 83 (1971). Professor Peller provides a
useful illustration:
Social roles are taken as objective to the same extent that they are seen to signify some
positive, rather than merely relational, term. The teacher is socially created as "teacher"
only in relation to the way "students" are socially created. There is no positive content to
the roles themselves outside of their relational status. From within the subject/object di-
chotomization, however, the roles are seen to have positive content, and to exist as objec-
tive terms with fixed natures, which foreclose alternative possibilities for social
organization. In short, they are reified.
Peller, supra note 7, at 1282. In another context, Professor Catharine MacKinnon explains:
Objectification in marxist materialism is thought to be the foundation of human freedom,
the work process whereby a subject becomes embodied in products and relationships.
Alienation is the socially contingent distortion of that process, a reification of products and
relations which prevents them from being, and from being seen as, dependent on human
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not only their right to historical change, but also the reality of their para-
doxical continued existence. If the Mashpee only could be "Indians" by
fitting into the definitions relied upon by the court and the defense, then
the Mashpee's lived experience was devalued to the extent it did not con-
form. Moreover, by arguing that the Mashpee had been assimilated into
the dominant culture merely because they had adopted some forms of
that culture meant that the Mashpee could not change, even if they de-
termined that some cultural adaptation was necessary to their own cul-
tural survival.
Thus, the story of the Mashpee and their "otherness" can be told in
several ways. Whether that story could be told in a way that is legally
relevant, while still encompassing the multiple paradoxes of the general
inquiry, remains the central problem.
At least one version of the Mashpee story begins with the rise of
"Indian consciousness" 90 in the late 1960s and 1970s that resulted in
compelling political expression, partially through established legal mech-
anisms and institutions. Among the manifestations of this consciousness
were the so-called Indian land claim suits of the 1970s.91 These legal
attacks on what were believed to be secure land titles were devastatingly
upsetting to white landowners largely because they had the potential to
undercut more than a century of settled expectations92 and redistribute
agency. But from the point of view of the object, objectification is alienation. For women,
there is no distinction between objectification and alienation because women have not au-
thored objectifications, they have been them .... Reification, similarly, is not merely an
illusion to the reified; it is also their social reality.
C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 124 (1989).
90. See P. MATrHIESSEN, IN THE SPIrr OF CRAzY HORSE 33-58 (1983) (chronicling the rise
of the American Indian Movement and the United States Government's attempts to violently dis-
rupt and disband it).
91. There is an interesting parallel to the Indian land claim suits, as discussed supra note 10, in
the emergence of Mexican-American political consciousness of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. See
generally M. GARCIA, MEXICAN AMERICANS: LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND IDENTITY, 1930-
1960 (1989). Quite apart from the development of "chicano" consciousness was the "Hispano-In-
dio" movement of New Mexico. With much less success, that movement attempted to enforce land
claims which antedated the formal jurisdiction of the United States over that territory.
92. The essence of the power of law comes from its seeming connectedness to "the way things
are and have always been." See Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 185, 186-88 (1980). As Sax explains:
The essence of property law is respect for reasonable expectations. The idea of justice at
the root of private property protection calls for identification of those expectations which
the legal system ought to recognize .... To put the idea of expectations in a broader
context, one might say that stability, and the protection of stable relationships, is one of the
most basic and persistent concerns of the legal system. Stability in ownership is what we
protect with property rights .... Of course, stability does not mean the absence of
change, nor does it mean political or legal reaction. It does mean a commitment to evolu-
tionary rather than revolutionary change, for the rate of change and the capacity it pro-
vides for transition are precisely what separate continuity and adaptation from crisis and
collapse.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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power in a material way. The suits sought to shift control over the most
basic material resource, land. What made the Mashpee's challenge par-
ticularly disconcerting to the white landowners was that it was con-
ducted according to rules the now-frightened, non-Indian landowners
felt compelled to respect-a lawsuit.
The Mashpee's story might begin another way. From the founding
of the plantation for South Sea Indians and the Village of Mashpee until
the middle 1960s, the area now known as the Town of Mashpee was
controlled by people who identified themselves as Mashpee Wampanoag
Indians. The Indian people of Mashpee exercised all the political power
normally associated with Massachusetts' municipalities, including con-
trol over land use and permits for public activities. 93 How the Mashpee
actually described themselves was immaterial to their exercise of power.
The normal disputes that arose out of the conduct of municipal affairs
were, in effect, family squabbles. Even if some Mashpee did not approve
of how others were acting, the integrity of the group remained
unchallenged.
Circumstances drastically changed, however, in the mid-1960s. An
influx of non-Indians who were not incorporated into the Mashpee peo-
ple94 shifted the balance of political power in the town.95 With a change
of political power in the community from Indian to non-Indians came
changes in the material conditions of life in Mashpee. Land formerly
open to the community was posted by its new private owners. Seaside
resort developments were planned where only unspoiled woods and
shoreline existed before. These changes were unsettling to the long-term
Indian residents of Mashpee, who turned to the Non-Intercourse Act as
93. J. CLIFFORD, supra note 41, at 279.
94. Much earlier in Mashpee history (although continuing to some extent throughout
Mashpee's existence), the Tribe had taken in outsiders who subsequently became part of the
Mashpee people. Some of the early non-Indians who intermarried into the Tribe complained about
the limitations that Indian ways placed upon their ambition and tried to change those ways. At least
initially they did not succeed. The full extent of their success across the whole of Mashpee history,
however, became a central issue in the Mashpee's land claim suit. See supra note 52 and accompa-
nying text.
95. As James Clifford notes:
"Cape Cod's Indian Town" had finally been discovered. For centuries a backwater and a
curiosity, in the 1950s and 1960s Mashpee land became desirable as a site for retirement,
vacation homes, condominiums, and luxury developments. Fast roads now made it acces-
sible as a bedroom and weekend suburb of Boston.... The town government, still run by
Indians, enjoyed a surge in tax revenues. But when local government passed out of Indian
control, perhaps for good, and as the scale of development increased, many Indians began
to feel qualms. What they had taken for granted-that this was their town-no longer
held true.... The land claim, while focusing on a loss of property in the nineteenth cen-
tury, was actually an attempt to regain control of a town that had slipped from Indian
hands very recently.
J. CLIFFORD, supra note 41, at 279-80.
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a means of halting development and restructuring political power in their
town.96
The story might begin yet another way. In 1901 in a case entitled
Montoya v. United States,97 the United States Supreme Court declared:
"By a 'tribe' we understand a body of Indians of the same or similar race,
united in a community under one leadership or government, and inhab-
iting a particular, though sometimes ill-defined territory ... -98 The
Montoya definition of "Tribe" was crucial to the Mashpee's claim, since
the Non-Intercourse Act99-the legal heart of their land claim suit-only
protected "Tribes" from the depredations of unscrupulous or unwise
land deals. Rather than proving tribal identity in their own terms, the
Mashpee were forced to present themselves in terms adopted by Montoya
and subsequent cases. °00 More importantly, there was little authority on
the definition of a Tribe. A group of Indians could be described legally
as a "Tribe" or a "band," or as a "Tribe" for some purposes but not for
others.101 The structure of the narrative required by the precedent-as
"fact-denuded rule"' 02-privileged the definition adopted by Montoya.
The privileged Montoya narrative rested not merely on the founda-
tion of rules governing both authoritative (fact-denuded) and explanatory
(fact-filled) examples; the legal narrative was privileged because the rules
governing the construction of the storytelling encompassed a complete
perspective. Those rules-rules of evidence-give preference to docu-
mentary evidence over "mere" recollection of the Tribe's members. Re-
corded memory relies less on the memory of the teller. The elevation of
documentary evidence over oral recollection effectively debased the
Mashpee's foundation of self-knowledge--their way of looking at, and
knowing, themselves.
More important than just controlling the telling of stories in legal
discourse, the rules also project reified social relations. The material so-
cial relations of the Mashpee that cannot be called up through documen-
tary evidence have to be made to fit the model of Indian society projected
by the rules. The relations must be translated into the form established
96. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
97. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
98. Id at 266.
99. See 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1988); see also supra note 25.
100. At the time the Mashpee's claim was tried, two Supreme Court opinions cited Montoya as
an appropriate source for the legal definition of "Tribe." See United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357,
364 (1933); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 442 (1926).
101. "We are more concerned in this case with the meaning of the words 'tribe' and 'band.'...
[By 'band,' we mean] a company of Indians not necessarily, though often of the same race or tribe,
but united under the same leadership in a common design." Montoya, 180 U.S. at 266.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
[Vol. 1990:625
TRANSLATING YONNONDIO
by the rules to be comprehended by legal discourse, regardless of whether
the self-constructed reality of the Mashpee corresponds to the legal
model. Worse, these reified social relations are projected upon a back-
ground of settled expebtations that run directly counter to the claims the
Mashpee made. In order for the Mashpee's legal claim to make "sense,"
it must be phrased within a strictly legal context, and that context must
include the justification for displacing two centuries of "the way things
are."
In the context of this lawsuit, once "Tribe" became exclusively a
legal construct, it embodied all of the subsidiary or provisional social
meanings that gave it life within a pseudo-objective legal form. By enter-
ing the universe of legal discourse, the term "Tribe," in the context of the
Non-Intercourse Act, has no meaning for the internal perspective of peo-
ple claiming that status. Instead, "Tribe" means a group of indigenous
people who have structured their existence in such a way that outsiders,
specifically legal experts, would say the grouping is a "Tribe." Thus the
legal notion of "Tribe" contains within it projected ethnological catego-
ries as well as political categories.
A Tribe is incapable of legal self-definition. Instead, it must point to
something that then points back and leads others to declare the Tribe is
indeed what it claims to be. That "something" functions as an indexical
sign-that is, the information the sign supplies does not dispose of the
legal identity, but merely suggests where an answer may be found. The
"things" that the Indians must point to in order to establish they are a
Tribe are the authoritative examples discussed earlier.
These authoritative examples are index-like in nature because they
define the significance of other signs. Land can function as such a sign.
The land is a constituent element of the Tribe itself. Without the requi-
site documentation, the land is only a part of the Tribe's cultural self-
definition, but is legally meaningless. A Tribe can point to the land it
occupies and controls as a sign that it exists. Thus, although the land
becomes part of what constitutes tribal existence, it is a signal that the
law can ignore.
But if a Tribe is still capable of constituting itself outside of the legal
process, what need is there for legal recognition? The law polices the
boundaries between contending cultures and provides one possible foun-
dation for the integrity of subordinate cultures. As has been illustrated,
law also can be culturally subversive. For example, the indexical value of
land in establishing identity is completely different than the legal value of
land inscribed in deeds. The latter is legally recognized as ownership,
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carrying with it all the legal freight that "ownership" implies.10 3 The
former may have constitutive power, but it appears to signify nothing
when translated into the idiom of legal discourse.104 In this way, the law
can undermine the foundational significance of land for a particular
culture.
A deed signifies ownership. In the discourse of law, ownership of
some interest is the most important relationship one can have to land.
Yet according ownership this role occludes the important constitutive
power specific land has for people and communities. We see this tension
everywhere: in the "penny auctions" of the recent farm crisis 0 5 and in
the land claim suits brought by Indians.
The importance of community identity looms as large as the impor-
tance of "ownership" for any individual proprietor. The elevation to a
dominant position of one aspect of a complex relationship reflects the
power inherent in legal discourse to corrupt meaning, as well as the role
of legal translation in that process.
CONCLUSION
Hegel once wrote that the relationship between the individual and the
community can be looked at in only two ways: "[E]ither we start from
the substantiality of the ethical order [such as, the traditions and laws
103. Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 996 (1939).
Pound comments on Duguit's assertion that property is merely a social function:
[Tlhere are no such things as rights. There are only social functions .... "Liberty," says
Duguit, "is a function." He adds: "Today each person is considered as having a social
function to fulfill and therefore is under a social duty to develop to the greatest possible
extent his physical, intellectual and moral personality in order to perform his function most
effectively."
Note how property tied up with liberty in this theory of state enforcement of social
functions. According to the civilians, property involves six rights: ajuspossidende or right
of possessing, a right in the strict sense; ajusprohibendi or right of excluding others, also a
right in the strict sense; ajus disponendi or right of disposition, what we should now call a
legal power; ajus utendi or right of using, what we should now call a liberty; ajusfruendi
or right of enjoying the fruits and profits; and a jus abutendi or right of destroying or
injuring if one likes-the two last also what today we should call liberties. Thus at least
half of the content of a right of property is liberty-freedom of applying as one likes, free of
legal restraint. But, says Duguit, "property is not a right; it is a social function. The
owner, that is to say the possessor of wealth, by the fact of his possession, has a social
function to perform." If he does not perform it, the state is to intervene and compel him to
employ it "according to its nature."
Id. at 997.
104. See, eg., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)
(permitting federal agency to build a highway through sacred tribal land did not impose unreasona-
ble burden on religion, eyen though road rendered religious practice impossible; land was not owned
by the Tribes).
105. Penny auctions, first used in the 1930s, were collective action taken by farmers to prevent
foreclosure sales of neighbors' land. A group would gather on the day of the sale and attempt to
prevent anyone from bidding on the land or equipment that was being sold.
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of a given community], or else we proceed atomistically and build on
the basis of single individuals." 10 6
Regulation of the interaction of groups within a polity that has
taken the individual as a foundation for its moral and political order as-
sumes a special poignancy where cultures conflict irreconcilably. Law
provides no place of grace because what is at issue is the definition of the
polity. To grant sub-groups a special status or alternative basis for defin-
ing themselves calls into question the "substantiality of the ethical order"
that defines "fights" in terms of individuals. Yet structuring the debate
in this way, as illustrated above, merely means that the proponents of the
preservation of aboriginal claims ultimately will lose. It does no good to
claim otherwise, unless the basis for the aboriginal claims can be recon-
structed on the basis of group identity. The preservation of an alterna-
tive order is a direct challenge to the plenary power of Congress and to
any notions of sovereignty other than a dependent sovereignty so con-
stricted that it cannot deflect countervailing normative visions of com-
munity. The law, as it has been narrowly conceived in this Essay, creates
at most a space where politics may be practiced, but it is itself an ineffec-
tive form of politics, especially for those who would change the prevail-
ing order.
As was argued in an earlier essay, the hope for the development of
alternative cultural norms lies in the creation of a real cultural plural-
ism. 10 7 A "real cultural pluralism" is one that within the context of a
democratic polity, respects the cultural foundations for differently con-
ceived notions of the "good" and provides a social space for such concep-
tions to take on material form. The material aspects of a culture's
existence should not be underestimated. Without the concrete capacity
to reproduce itself, a culture must wither and disappear. With the disap-
pearance of each culture, the range of possible futures available to indi-
vidual persons must also wither and decline.
Our culture enables us to make sense of our lives and determines, to
a large extent, which life choices we make. And those choices must
make sense according to the stories our culture tells about us:
We decide how to lead our lives by situating ourselves in certain cul-
tural narratives, by adopting roles that have struck us as worthwhile
ones, as ones worth living.... [Yet] [o]ur upbringing isn't something
that can just be erased-it is, and always remains, a constitutive part of
106. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Individualism, and Minority Rights, in LAW AND THE COMMUNITY
181 (A. Hutchinson & L. Green eds. 1989) (quoting G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 261 ('.M.
Knox ed. 1942)) (discussing the liberal dilemma facing the Canadians in their attempt to redefine the
federal government's relationship to Native peoples).
107. See generally Torres, supra note 84 (arguing that progress toward cultural pluralism re-
quires altered understanding of the bargain that must be struck).
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who we are. Cultural membership affects our very sense of personal
identity and capacity.108
Rather than wash individuals clean of any differentiating character-
istics as a logical step prior to the assignment of rights, the recognition of
qultural identity as an irreducible component of personal identity re-
quires that we ask how group membership ought to be taken into ac-
count. Importantly, this recognition requires us to ask how group
membership determines the capacity of the individual, who is the con-
cern of liberal theory, to make "worthwhile choices." If the failure to
respect a cultural grouping results in a limitation of the individual's ca-
pacity for self-determination, then the political choice leading to that end
is indefensible on liberal grounds.1 9
The Hegelian characterization. of the tension between the individual
and community presumes a single polity. The question it cannot answer
is whether a truly culturally pluralistic, liberal-democratic system is fea-
sible. Are we willing to have truly independent cultural enclaves that
define their own polity or create their own normative definition of com-
munity? The acceptance of such apossibility generates the potential for
alternative cultural spheres in which the future may be imagined in a
variety of ways, including rejection of the enlightenment project that is at
the heart of liberal democratic theory. If that liberal faith is abandoned,
what is the basis for mediating disputes between cultures? Without a
reexamination of the foundation for liberal rights, the attempt to remake
the argument for aboriginal claims from the perspective of liberal theory
is fundamentally misguided.
Before these questions can be answered, remember that cultures
have a material and inter-subjective dimension. The debate about aborig-
inal claims in late 20th century America cannot be limited to the realm
of liberal democratic theory, but the debate also must include a critique
of the material conditions in which Indian life reproduces itself. Cultural
identity is integral to individual self-identity. To maximize the range of
life choices and to preserve the capacity for individual integrity requires,
in the context of aboriginal claims, that the cultural integrity of Tribes be
maintained. The law as presently structured allows no clear way to
achieve that end. In fact, the reality of Indian life is, in a real sense,
untranslatable. This untranslatability has a material dimension. Land
claims have no true aboriginal foundation but rather have a legal moor-
ing in the state, a mooring subject to change and reevaluation. The de-
velopmental priorities are set not by Indians, but by others. The very
108. Kymlicka, supra note 106, at 190, 193.
109. Id. at 194-99.
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theory of Indian sovereignty is debased by the -plenary power of
Congress.
The tragedy, of course, is that the failure is not merely a failure of
theory. The reservation system was badly conceived, but it never was
truly intended to provide a foundation for potentially competing powers.
The reservations were designed to pacify, not compensate. The loss that
Indians have suffered is material both in the damage to real people and in
the destruction of cultures. What has been ruined may be irretrievable,
and the continuing loss inexorable. To the extent cultures are destroyed
or rendered incapable of self-expression, we are destroying individuals in
disservice to what are ostensibly our own underlying values. We have
two choices: pluralism materially redefined or the cultural assimilation
implied in pluralism as we know it. Yet as one observer has noted:
"Protecting people's cultural community and facilitating their assimila-
tion into another culture are not equally legitimate options."110
110. Kymlicka, supra note 106, at 194; see also Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: First
Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, as presented to
the UN. Working Group on Indigenous Peoples by Chairman/Rapporteur Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, at
31 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33 (1989) (declaring the rights of indigenous peoples to maintain
autonomous cultures, including the material resources to preserve their cultures and participate in
the national government in a way sufficient to protect their interests).
Vol. 1990:625]
